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Over the years, Ghanaian governments have invested huge sums of money 
in programs and projects for socioeconomic development to improve 
their citizens’ well-being. However, the implementation of most of these 
programs and projects have failed and been abandoned. There is a lack 
of research addressing this issue and the specific causal mechanism 
through which politics and culture shapes these failed implementations 
and program abandonments. Partisan politics—which demonstrates 
strong favoritism toward one’s preferred political party, adherence to 
party policies, and reluctance to compromise with political opponents—
provides an appropriate framework to clarify the role of politics in 
programs and projects ineffective implementation and abandonment 
debates. Drawing on political theory and the partisan politics literature, 
this study explores the role partisan politics plays in the implementation 
failure and abandonment of government programs and projects in Ghana. 
Our analysis reveals three causal factors: political culture, political 
corruption, and poor planning and implementation, which are shaped 
by partisan politics in the Ghanaian context. This impacts negatively on 
the unity and socioeconomic development of the country.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors of Politics & 
Policy for their valuable feedback and comments.
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Los efectos de la política en la implementación de programas / proyectos del 
gobierno: Información de una economía en desarrollo
A lo largo de los años, los gobiernos de Ghana han invertido grandes sumas 
de dinero en programas y proyectos para el desarrollo socioeconómico para 
mejorar el bienestar de sus ciudadanos; sin embargo, la implementación 
de la mayoría de estos programas y proyectos ha fallado, lo que ha llevado 
al abandono. Hay una falta de investigación que aborde este tema y el 
mecanismo causal específico a través del cual la política y la cultura 
configuran estas implementaciones y abandonos fallidos. La política 
partidista, que demuestra un fuerte favoritismo hacia el partido político, 
la adhesión a las políticas del partido y la renuencia a comprometerse con 
los opositores políticos proporciona un marco apropiado para aclarar el 
papel de la política en los programas y proyectos de implementación 
ineficaz y debates de abandono. Sobre la base de la teoría política y la 
literatura política partidista, este estudio explora el papel que juega la 
política partidista en el fracaso de la implementación y el abandono de 
los programas y proyectos gubernamentales en Ghana. Nuestro análisis 
revela tres factores causales: cultura política, corrupción política y 
mala planificación e implementación, que son moldeados por la política 
partidista en el contexto ghanés. Esto impacta negativamente en la 
unidad y el desarrollo socioeconómico del país.
Palabras Clave: Ghana, África Subsahariana, Cultura política, Desarrollo, 
Política partidista, Implementación de políticas, Abandono de proyectos, 
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Government policies are often translated into programs and projects (Freedman 
and McGavock 2015; Goodman and Love 1980; Haveman et al. 2015). Given that 
programs and projects measure economic growth (Alzahrani and Emsley 2013), 
government programs, and project performance are key to the performance of 
every government. Therefore, the role of government programs and projects in 
national development cannot be overemphasized. Extant literature (see e.g., Alic 
2008; Eichengreen 1994, 1996; Eichengreen and Vazquez 1999) shows that major 
infrastructural development projects have emerged as a means for developing 
nations to achieve faster economic development. In fact, “project-based work has 
become a critical component of global industrial activity” (Pinto 2013, 643); and 
as such are inevitable in development. For instance, after World War II there were 
high levels of economic growth mainly in the Western world. This growth—which 
has variously been named as “post-World II economic expansion,” “post-war 
economic boom,” “the long boom,” or “Golden Age of Capitalism,” etc.—saw 
states embark on major strategic programs/projects to facilitate such growth and 
developmental plans (Alic 2008; Eichengreen 1994, 1996; Eichengreen and Vazquez 
1999). For instance, the shift away from an agricultural development strategy pre-
World War II to science development through research and development post-
World War II to the present (that made the United States of America a superpower 
state) has been administered through various programs and projects. Clear 
examples include government-funded research projects instituted in universities 
for postgraduate students to conduct research aimed at enhancing economic and 
defense development; for example, the Manhattan Project—established to produce 
materials for the production of bombs (Alic 2008).
The recent growth witnessed in many countries, especially in emerging 
economies, indicates that government or public programs and projects are 
indispensable in national development. The introduction of an e-government 
system to facilitate government transactions is a typical example of the 
importance of government programs and projects. It enables government(s) to 
use technology—especially web-based applications—to improve access to, and 
efficiently convey, government information and services (Brown and Brudney 
2001); to establish relationships between a government and its citizens, other 
governments, and businesses (Means and Schneider 2000); to use ICT facilities, 
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such as the Internet, in the form of databases, networking, discussion support, 
multimedia, automation, tracking and tracing, and personal identification 
technologies (Jaeger 2003; Luk 2009); and to facilitate communication during 
the implementation of strategic national developments (Gichoya 2005).
Even the economic growth led by private companies and capitalists that 
has been witnessed by many countries was initiated and regulated by various 
governments through programs and projects (see Eichengreen 1996). Nevertheless, 
the literature (Republic of Ghana 2012, 2015) indicates that the implementation 
of some of these government programs and projects has failed and resulted in 
abandonment. Given this, it is surprising that studies devoted to government 
program and project abandonment in developing countries are rare. Furthermore, 
researchers who do discuss this topic have focused on generic factors that lead 
to failed implementation and abandonment or failure criteria such as delays and 
cost overruns. The present study adds to the literature by exploring how political 
factors create conditions that lead to failed government programs’ implementation 
and abandonment. We adopt case studies of projects abandoned by the Ghanaian 
government in addressing the research aims. We focus on the Ghanaian context 
because it is particularly illuminating to examine how partisanship has influenced 
Ghanaian government program abandonment, given the highly partisan political 
nature of implementing government programs and projects in that country 
(Damoah and Akwei 2017; Damoah, Akwei, and Mouzughi 2015).
Over the years, a significant amount of money has been solicited from the IMF, 
the World Bank, agencies, and taxpayers by the Ghanaian government to embark on 
programs and projects that seek to improve socioeconomic development (Ahmed 
et al. 2016; Republic of Ghana 2012, 2015). Some of these programs and projects 
have not been followed through (Republic of Ghana 2012, 2015). For instance, 
the postcolonial era saw many state policies turned into programs and projects 
through the ideology of industrialization, but they ended up being abandoned 
(Aryeetey and Harrigan 2000; Damoah and Akwei 2017; Jeffries 1982; Williams 
2017). This article examines some of the most notable and costly failed policies 
and programs in Ghana and asks the question: what political factors account for 
these failed implementations and abandonments? In the next section, we present a 
review of the literature on government programs and project abandonment. This is 
followed by an analysis of the research method and research context by providing 
an overview of Ghanaian government program and project abandonment. The 
subsequent section presents the findings. The last section presents the conclusions, 
highlighting the contributions to both theory and practice.
Government Programs and Projects: Failed Implementation and Abandonment
Failed programs, project implementation, and abandonment occur where 
a government or key stakeholders prematurely halt the implementation of a 
project before it is fully completed or the project fails to achieve its original 
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objectives (García-Quevedo, Segarra-Blasco, and Teruel-Carrizosa 2018). 
This can be attributed to a host of organization-specific and external macro 
environmental factors. Past studies indicate that such failures may stem from 
organization-specific factors such as mismanagement, frequent changes in 
management teams, lack of skilled personnel, scarce financial resources, lack 
of communication, poor leadership, and the action and inactions of the project 
leaders (Amankwah-Amoah 2016; García-Quevedo, Segarra-Blasco, and 
Teruel-Carrizosa 2018). Another line of thinking suggests that such an exit can 
be attributed to external macro environmental factors such as recessions, changes 
in government, conflicts, and natural disasters (Amankwah-Amoah and Zhang 
2015). Table 1 provides an overview of other general causes of project failure, 
together with the most relevant existing research published in each area.
Partisanship Politics, Clientelism, and Political Culture in Public Sector 
Management
Partisanship Politics
The extant literature on political theories suggests that there is a clear 
relationship between partisanship politics and the public sector management of 
states (Asunka 2016; Bob-Milliar 2012; Fiorina 2002; Luna 2015). However, the 
degree of partisan influence on the public sector management of states depends 
Table 1. General Causes of Project Failure
Type of Causes Authors and year of Publication
Communication Raymond and Bergeron (2008); Weijermars (2009); Wong, Cheung, 
and Fan (2009); Wi and Jung (2010); Ochieng and Price (2010)
Expertise/knowledge Perkins (2006); Sambasivan and Soon (2007); Ruuska and Teigland 
(2009); Hwang and Ng (2013)
Funding/finance World Bank (2004); Sambasivan and Soon (2007); Sweis and others 
(2008); Clausen and Attaran (2011)
Planning Odenyika and yusif  (1997); Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006); Pourrostam 
and Ismail (2011); Pinto (2013)
Resources World Bank (2004); Sambasivan and Soon (2007); Teigland and 
Lindqvist (2007); Sweis and others (2008); Ruuska and Teigland 
(2009); Clausen and Attaran (2011); Hwang and Ng (2013)
Scope change Kaliba, Muya, and Mumba (2009); Ahonen and Savolianen (2010); 
Liu and others (2011)
Socioculture Blunt (1980); Hofstede (1983); Hogberg and Adamsson (1983); 
Adler (1983); Blunt and Jones (1997); Muriithi and Crawford 
(2003); Heeks (2002, 2006); Saad, Cicmil, and Greenwood (2002); 
Alsakini, Wikström, and Kiiras (2004); Maumbe, Owei, and 
Alexander (2008); Amid, Moalagh, and Ravasan (2012) 
[Correction added on December 16, 2020 after first online 
publication: The citation “Sambasvian and Soon (2007)” was edited 
to “Sambasivan and Soon (2007)” to reflect the correct spelling.]
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on the type of governance system being practiced and the level of democratic 
development (Fiorina 2002). Partisanship politics is defined differently in the 
literature. Muirhead (2006, 714) defines partisanship as the political orientation 
of citizens who stand with a party. The orientation is both psychological 
and behavioral. It is psychological when “the citizens identify with a party 
and behavioral in that they usually vote for it, and possibly give it time and 
money” (Efthymiou 2017). In multiparty systems partisanship is used to refer 
to politicians who have strong favorability to their party’s policies and hardly 
compromise with the policies of their political opponents. Thus, in this article, 
we define partisanship as the placing of commitment to a political party at its 
core, thus prioritizing party loyalty (see also Efthymiou 2017; Mair 2013).
Standard political agency models generally predict an inverse relationship 
between the degree of partisan allegiances among citizens and political 
accountability (Besley 2007; Persson and Tabellini 2000). Thus, the more 
electorate pay allegiance to their affiliated political parties, the less they hold 
their politically appointed officials accountable for their stewardship. The extant 
empirical studies over the years from different contexts confirm this inverse 
relationship (see e.g., Anderson 2000; Hellwig and Samuels 2008; Kayser and 
Wlezien 2011). Thus, when voters are strongly attached to their parties’ victories, 
the electoral control of politicians suffers.
For example, using Eurobarometer data from eight European countries 
between 1976 and 1992 inclusive, Kayser and Wlezien (2011) found a strong 
inverse relationship between partisanship and economic votes—the effects of 
economic performance on election outcome is stronger in places where there 
is low affinities to political parties and vice versa. Using Afrobarometer from 
18 Sub-Saharan African countries that practice multiparty democracies, Chang 
and Kerr (2016) found that citizens’ perception and tolerance for the corruption 
of politicians has varying degrees, depending on whether they are insiders or 
outsiders. Those who are inside the clientelist networks simultaneously perceive 
corruption as ubiquitous and are more tolerant of malfeasance than those 
who are outside the network. Thus, patronage insiders are more tolerant to 
political corruption than outsiders. Moreover, those individuals with partisan 
or ethnic ties to the incumbent politicians are less likely to consider corruption 
as widespread and vice versa. Insiders are, therefore, less likely to vote these 
politicians out than their counterparts (outsiders). In an analysis of election 
results from 75 countries, Hellwing and Samuels (2008) found that citizens use 
elections as a form of punishment or reward for incumbent parliamentarians 
and this economic voting serves as a check on politicians for their stewardship. 
However, in countries and places where there is a high affiliation of electorates 
to political parties, this relationship becomes weak.
Political Clientelism
Partisanship politics is aligned to political clientelism. “Political clientelism 
refers to the practice of providing personal favors jobs, contracts, welfare 
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support, money, and so forth in exchange for electoral support” (Berenschot 
2018, 1564). Thus, clientelism involves an exchange between the individual 
politicians/political party seeking election victory and individuals or a group 
citizenry. The individual or group receives a targeted benefit or avoidance of any 
penalty through contributing to the ambitions of the politicians/political party 
(yıldırım and Kitschelt 2020). There are two critical elements of clientelism: 
targeting and conditionality. Clientelist exchange also differs depending on the 
kind of resources, on networks that facilitate the exchange and the durability 
of the exchange, on whether it is single-shot (vote-buying), and on relational 
exchanges over extended periods of time (yıldırım and Kitschelt 2020).
Clientelism takes many forms from vote buying, preferential access to 
public employment, social benefits, public works, and procurement (yıldırım 
and Kitschelt 2020). First, let us consider consumer goods—which refers to 
“vote-buying”—and tangible goods, that is, a relational clientelism. The 
consumer goods form of clientelism is most beneficial to single-shot clientelism. 
Second, preferential access to public (or quasi-public) employment occurs where 
patronage is geared toward long-term job rewards for loyal partisan supporters, 
in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector. Third, delivering 
social benefits framed as advantages for social provision schemes can emerge 
where clientelist efforts are based on an entitlement formula for longer periods 
of time or as spot market transactions during the election process. The clientele 
has access to preferential material advantages in the social policy schemes, and 
this gives benefits from scholarships or public housing to individuals or locally 
bounded group. Fourth, the public works/procurement category, which is also 
a relational clientelism, plays a significant role in the linkage of clientelism and 
the different types of polities. It involves the awards of contract based on the 
recipient for preferential access to government contracts or procurement; that is, 
when the party operatives control the award or in a nonopen competitive bidding 
process. Finally, clientelism can involve interference with administrative and 
regulatory proceedings and making decisions concerning tax rules, economic 
and environmental regulation, or building security codes by supervisory agencies.
Political Culture
Political culture is often described as the historically based, widely shared 
beliefs, feelings, and values concerning the nature of political systems that serve as 
a link between citizens and the government (Almond and Verba 1963; Formisano 
2001). Research on political culture began with Banfield’s (1958) work on “amoral 
familism.” According to Banfield, the social actions of people within a community 
is oriented toward the economic interests of the nuclear family and does not 
translate to the extended family. Thus, in a society displaying amoral familism, 
people focus more on their family and friends rather than on a collective approach. 
This has generated interest in the role that familism and culture play in facilitating 
or hindering economic development. This theory has been a basis for further 
elaborations and development of theories and typologies of political culture.
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For example, Almond and Verba (1963) categorized political culture 
into three areas that can create civic culture. These include: (1) “deference,” 
which considers the concepts of respect, acknowledgment of “inferiority,” or 
“superiority,” and authority in society; (2) “consensus,” which represents the 
key link between government and public agreement and appeasement. Support 
for appeasement may not always be shared by the whole nation, but as a whole, 
people agree to sustain it, which implies that it is a common agreement; and 
(3) “homogeneity” of the people as they view themselves as one people with 
common goals. Furthermore, Douglas (1970) developed a two-dimensional 
framework of cultural comparisons of political culture, a grid or constraint by 
rules, and a group or incorporation into a bounded social unit.
This was expanded into four grids/groups that constitute stable social 
configurations and are associated with distinctive values of individualism, 
fatalism, hierarchy, and egalitarianism (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Putnam 
(1971), studied elite political culture that refers to a set of politically relevant 
beliefs, values, and habits of most highly involved and influential participants 
in a political system. Elite political culture is divided into “ideological politics” 
and the “end of ideology.” Ideological politics refers to the political style; that is, 
the way politicians think and speak about policy problems using twelve stylistic 
characteristics such as inductive and deductive thinking, historical context, 
moralization, and reference to distributive groups benefits. An index of ideological 
style of a politician is determined based on the ratings of stylistic characteristics 
that cluster in intelligible ways, and the dominant stylistic dimension. Politicians 
who rank high on the index are more ideologically motivated, more abstract in their 
conceptions of politics, especially party politics, and more idealistic than their less 
“ideological” colleagues. They are also more alienated from existing sociopolitical 
institutions and are concentrated at the extremes of the political spectrum.
Despite the commonalities of what constitutes political culture, extensive 
evidence suggests that political culture has varying values that link society to the 
government (Almond and Verba 1963). This suggests that what may be deemed as 
political culture in one country may not be considered as such by other countries 
(Ferragina 2009). Political culture determines how governments are organized 
and also serves as the foundation of the form of government and governance 
practices of a country (Almond and Verba 1963). This would, therefore, provide 
the avenue for the success or failure of the governance system adopted/adapted 
by a country (Almond and Verba 1963). Hence, an understanding of a county’s 
political culture provides clues and cues to political relationships between the 
governed and the government (Almond and Verba 1963).
The theoretical background of political theory can be traced to Almond 
and Verba (1963) who published their study on political cultures linked to five 
democratic countries: Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. They observed that, even though all the five countries practice 
democracy, their political culture differs. Using the differences in their political 
practices, they identified three main political cultures. First, parochial political 
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culture—which is linked to Mexico, a country where citizens are mostly 
uninformed and unaware of their government and take little interest in the 
political process. Second, subject political culture—which identified Germany 
and Italy as countries where citizens are somewhat informed and aware of 
their government and occasionally participate in the political process. Third, 
participant political culture, which identified the United Kingdom and the 
United States as countries where citizens are informed and actively participate 
in the political process. Since their work in 1963, there have been debates, 
arguments, and counterarguments concerning what constitutes political 
culture. However, the foundation of the concept of political culture is that the 
organization of political processes and the relationship between the governed 
and the government depends on sets of shared beliefs, feelings, and values 
concerning the nature of political systems over a period of time. And, these 
shared beliefs serve as a link between citizens and government.
An Overview of Ghanaian Political Culture, Partisan Politics, and Clientelism
Political culture is thus seen as the set of attitudes, practices, beliefs, and values 
that shape the political behavior and judgment. The political culture, therefore, 
reflects the type of government, and incorporates key elements of the history 
and traditions of previous regimes. Political culture in every society is important 
due to its ability to shape the political perceptions of a regime. Ghana, which 
practices a presidential system of governance, has witnessed political stability 
since 1992 and has not experienced any civil war in its history. Administratively, 
the country is divided into ten regions, which are further divided into 216 districts 
or municipalities. From 1992 to date, there have been six successive free, fair, 
and transparent elections and, as a result, the country is considered as the 
“eye” of Africa in democracy (leading in democratic practices) by international 
organizations and unions such as the African Union, the Economic Community 
of West African States, and the European Union (Agyeman-Duah 2008; Debrah 
2009). Accordingly, the country has seen its democratic ranking in the world 
improve over the years (Economist Intelligence Unit 2014). However, even 
though the country practices multiparty democracy, only two political parties 
have won power in successive elections in the fourth republic starting from 1992. 
This has led to partisan politics and clientelism, which may have a significant 
impact on Ghanaian government program and project implementation as well as 
on decisions to abandon such projects or programs.
Partisanship politics and the adoption of a “winner takes all” strategy has 
indirectly led to high clientelism in Ghana. Accordingly, citizens join political 
parties in return for different incentives, which include but are not limited to 
survival strategy, practical ends, immediate or remote incentives, and social and 
individual gains within Ghana (Bob-Milliar 2012). Political parties are, therefore, 
expected to meet the material motives of their members (Bob-Milliar 2012). 
Nonetheless, to receive these benefits, members are expected to significantly 
participate in the activities of the party either in kind or cash (Bob-Milliar 2012; 
1170 | POLITICS & POLICy / December 2020
Luna 2015). Hence, the choice of candidates to represent various parties at all 
levels involves participation (Bob-Milliar 2012). In a study of political party 
financing, Luna (2015) found that party finance shapes political organization in 
the country; political party chairs demand money from politicians who want to 
contest elections. Failure to comply risks the wrath of these political party chairs 
and the chance to represent the party at national levels. Consequently, these 
elected officials collude with politicians, bureaucrats, construction contractors, 
and political-party chairs to extract financial resources from the state when they 
are elected. This is done through the public procurement process.
Furthermore, the Ghanaian compliance with formal rules and procedures 
is significantly higher in districts where voters demonstrate a weak commitment 
to political parties and vice versa (Asunka 2016)—therefore, adherence to 
formal rules and procedures during program and project implementation within 
the public sector may be weak. In consequence, politicians have a significant 
opportunity to manipulate the weaknesses in the accountability system and 
extract public resources for private ends.
The high clientelism in the country has created institutional bottlenecks 
within the public administration system (Amoako and Lyon 2014; Killick 2008). 
As such, access to public administration and institution are difficult, which results 
in the payment of bribes (Afrobarometer 2019). This may hinder the effective 
implementation of government programs and projects. The Ghanaian public 
administration system has been created by, and is controlled by, politics and 
politicians rather than qualified professionals—thus, it is a partisanship political 
administrative system (Damoah and Akwei 2017). The constitution of Ghana 
entrusts enormous powers to the president and, as a result, s/he appoints public 
institutional heads including all district and municipal chief executives (The 
1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana). This is conducted in consultation 
with party executives (Luna 2015). Accordingly, all heads—including board 
members—of public institutions are appointed on political patronage (Luna 
2015). Program and project management team leaders are appointed on the same 
basis; hence, government project leaders are expected to be loyal to the president 
and the party they represent. As a result, ethical issues in the awarding and 
management of programs and projects are not perceived to be as important—
as portrayed by Heldman, Jansen, and Baca (2005)—to be followed during 
programs and projects implementation. There have been instances where a state 
official chairs a government project and becomes the sole supplier of materials 
for the project at a rate that is above the market rate (Takyi-Boadu 2011).
There may also be a cultural dimension for explaining public sector program 
and project abandonment. The role of the national culture in public sector 
program and project abandonment in Ghana may be traced to the Hofstede’s 
(1983) cultural dimensions. Hofstede provided six dimensions for culture—
power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term 
orientation, and indulgence. Pursuant to this, GLOBE (an organization dedicated 
to the study of culture, leadership, and organizational effectiveness) puts countries 
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into clusters based on these cultural attributes espoused by Hofstede (Hoppe 
2007). Using these six dimensions, the Ghanaian cultural attributes have been 
espoused in the following ways (see Appendix A for more details). In relation 
to power distance, the Ghanaian society is hierarchical in nature—practicing a 
master-servant relationship where the rich and those in authority, especially 
religious and political leaders, are revered (CIA 2015). This is in line with the 
findings of Asunka (2016), who identified that programs or project leaders who 
are political appointees could significantly influence government program and 
project abandonment. In addition, there is a very strong family bond, which serves 
as the primary source of identity, loyalty, and responsibility and, therefore, the 
country is regarded as feminine in terms of the masculinity dimension. This may 
affect the awarding and management of government programs and projects (The 
Hofstede Centre 2016). This national culture has translated into a political culture 
where political party members use the party as “family” and where they can get 
help, support, and identity (Bob-Milliar 2012).
There is also evidence that attitudes toward government work is poor. Some 
writers attribute this to cultural orientation during the colonial period, which could 
be linked to political-cultural orientation inherited from colonial times (Amponsah 
2010; Damoah and Akwei 2017; Damoah, Akwei, and Mouzughi 2015). Amponsah 
(2010), for instance, traces Ghanaian government project failure to colonial rule 
when public sector work was perceived as belonging to the “Whiteman” and as 
such could be handled haphazardly. We propose that these political factors may 
lead to Ghanaian government programs and project abandonment.
Cases of Ghanaian Abandoned Projects in the Public Sector
There are several cases of abandoned programs and projects in Ghana 
and this study focuses on five of them: affordable housing projects, senior high 
school education reform, the national identification system project, community 
day school building projects, and Ghana @50 jubilee projects.
Affordable Housing Projects
One notable area of project abandonment is in the housing sector. There 
are insufficient houses for Ghanaian citizens and as such most of these citizens 
“sleep rough” in kiosks, tents, containers, shops, offices, etc. (homeless people) 
(Boamah 2010). Estimates show that Ghana’s housing deficit is now two million 
units (Business News 2018). The houses that are available are mostly owned by 
private individuals and housing estate companies and not affordable for ordinary 
Ghanaians (Boamah 2010). Due to the magnitude of the housing issue, various 
government regimes have attempted to address this problem. For instance, the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration, which held office between 2001 
and 2009, proposed “affordable housing units” to solve the housing deficit in 
Borteyman and Kpone of the Greater Accra Region (Klutse 2009). The main 
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purpose of this project was to help those poor people living in very deplorable 
settlements to make the capital city and other major cities attractive (Boamah 
2010), and also to create employment, especially for women. The project was 
abandoned soon after it started (Klutse 2009). In an attempt by the subsequent 
government, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), to address this housing 
problem, a similar project was started in 2010 but it had to be abandoned after 
parliamentary approval, lands given to developers, and a sod-cutting ceremony 
was performed by the president (Zoure 2011).
Senior High School Education Reform
Despite the improvements in education after the colonial era as a result of 
World Bank and IMF-supported projects (World Bank ), the sector has witnessed 
program and project abandonment in educational reforms over the years. Many 
educational reform programs and projects have attempted to solve the educational 
problems since the first Republic of Ghana in 1961 (Nyarko 2011). These 
included the Kwapong 1974 and Dzobo 1972/1987 educational reform programs. 
Despite the huge sums of money spent on these programs and projects, the sector 
continues to suffer from many setbacks, including abandonment. A more recent 
failed program is the abandonment of the four-year Senior High School (SHS) 
education system. In 2002, a committee of 29 members—headed by the Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Education-Winneba, Professor Jophus Anamuah-
Mensah—was mandated to review the education system. The report led to the 
four-year SHS program/project which was implemented in 2007. At this time, 
the Ghanaian government, under the administration of NPP, then commenced 
the educational reform project to change the Senior Secondary Schools to Senior 
High Schools. The main changes here were an increase in study duration and the 
building of infrastructure to accommodate the extension of the duration. The 
project aimed to extend the three-year duration to four years (Modern Ghana 
2013). After one-and-a-half years of implementation, the project was abandoned 
following a change in government.
National Identification System Project
Another high-profile project that has been abandoned in recent years is the 
National Identification System project. This was a project to issue identification 
(ID) cards for all nationals and foreign nationals residing in Ghana. It was set 
up in 2008 under the National Identification Authority. Evidence indicates 
that the national ID card project has been totally abandoned in terms of its 
objectives, while only partially abandoned in terms of its implementation. Thus, 
the issuing of the card has witnessed checkered history. Furthermore, a 2011 
report indicated that issuing the ID cards had stopped and the very few that 
had been issued were not accepted as proof of ID in Ghanaian banks or by 
the Electoral Commission of Ghana (Kunateh 2014). Since then, successive 
governments to date have made attempts to revive the project but have not 
succeeded (Damoah and Akwei 2017). The most discouraging part of this was 
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the fact that the Electoral Commission, a government institution, has been 
registering and issuing voters’ ID cards for voting in successive general elections 
up to the present day (Abissath 2012; Adams and Asante 2019). This registration 
and issue of new biometric voter ID cards for the various general elections is a 
clear indication of project abandonment.
Community Day School Building Projects
The Community Day SHS Buildings is a high-profile mega-project initiated 
by the Ghanaian central government in 2013 to address the school building 
infrastructure deficit in the SHS education. The main purpose was to build 200 
Senior High Community Day Schools in rural communities to bridge the school 
building infrastructure gap between urban areas and rural dwellers (Republic of 
Ghana 2012). The government intended to introduce free SHS education and, 
as such, anticipated a further deficit in the infrastructure gap. However, after 
four years of implementation, the successes of these buildings have been mixed 
(Ahensah 2018; Republic of Ghana 2012). While some of them were completed, 
the majority of them have been abandoned. Specifically, of the proposed 200 
community day senior high buildings, only 50 were completed. The remaining 
150 were abandoned at various stages after change in government in 2016 
(Ahensah 2018).
Ghana @50 Jubilee Projects
Another notable failure involves the Ghana @50 projects. In 2007, 
Ghana celebrated its 50th Anniversary of Independence from colonial rule. 
To commemorate the occasion and to provide a long-lasting legacy, the 
anniversary—among other objectives—earmarked various projects, which 
included the building of Jubilee Parks in all ten regional capitals, the construction 
of toilets in all local communities, and the building of 140 Golden Jubilee 
Kindergartens throughout the country (Central Newspaper 2012; Daily Guide 
2011). However, reports indicate that most of these projects have either been 
abandoned or are not meeting the required standard and purpose of their usage. 
One clear example is the total abandonment of the Ghana @50 toilets (Central 
Newspaper 2012; Daily Guide 2011) and the Jubilee Parks (Daily Guide 2011). 
Regarding the toilet project, not even one of them is in use—they have been left 
in the bushes and were subsequently appropriated by squatters and “area boys” 
(gangsters) (Daily Guide 2011).
Method
The data for this study were collected using an in-depth semistructured 
interview to collate data from Project Management Practitioners (PMPs) 
in Ghana. Our intent was to elicit practitioner perceptions regarding the 
political reasons that account for Ghanaian government program and project 
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abandonment. The participants were purposely selected from the Ghana Business 
Directory (Ghana Business Directory 2014), and members of professional 
associations and institutions such as the Ghana Institute of Engineers, Ghana 
Association of Managers, Association of Building and Civil Engineering 
Contractors of Ghana, and the Chartered Institute of Project Management in 
Ghana. Purposive sampling was adopted as the researchers wanted to gather 
data from only those who had rich information concerning the subject under 
study. This sampling approach uses nonprobability sampling techniques.
As described by Patton (2002, 40), in this sampling approach, far less emphasis 
is placed on generalizing from a sample to a population and, therefore, greater 
attention is paid to a sample “purposely” selected for its potential to yield insight 
from its illuminative and rich information sources. The selection was based on the 
criteria that those selected would have a certain level of knowledge in the subject 
area being investigated, so information gathered would be reliable (Bryman 2012; 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2012; Teddlie and yu 2007). As a result of this, 
only practitioners who work for active and well-known companies were contacted 
to participate in the study. Moreover, only practitioners with a considerable 
amount of work experience and a significant number of years in program and 
project management practices were contacted to participate in the study. We also 
considered their academic background to ensure that participants had some level 
of academic and/or professional knowledge in program and project management 
and related fields. To ensure this, the researchers checked the profiles of the 
prospective participants through their company websites and via the Google 
search engine. Some were checked through their published work as well as on 
LinkedIn. The full demographic information is presented in Appendix B.
PMPs were experts who possess the technical know-how in relation to 
project management and can, therefore, provide expert opinions. They were 
directly involved in the implementation of government projects. We considered 
they also might be able to provide an independent opinion on government 
projects, as compared to other stakeholders such as the politicians and other, 
general, citizens. As stated by Bob-Milliar (2012), Asunka (2016), and Luna 
(2015), politicians and citizens have a strong attachment to their political parties 
and their government and their representatives. Therefore, these latter sets of 
stakeholders may provide opinions more biased than PMPs.
Prior to the full interview, initial pilot interviews were conducted to ensure 
that the interview “question guide” was appropriate. The panel consisted of three 
participants. By pretesting, the researchers followed the steps that Foddy (1994) 
prescribes should be followed to ensure the research questions’ validity and 
reliability. This is also conforms with the recommendations made by Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill (2012) on the three common approaches to ensuring the 
reliability of questions: tests and re-test, internal consistency, and alternative 
form. Data from the pilot interviews were also analyzed to ascertain if  there was 
a need to make any amendments. After the analysis of the pilot interview, some 
questions were eliminated while others were added.
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The full interview consisted of 30 participants. The number was not 
predetermined at the start of the data collection. In line with other studies using 
semi-structured interviews and as recommended by researchers such as Morse 
(2000), Hill and others (2005), Silverman (2013), and Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 
(2006), this study used saturation: the point at which the data has been thoroughly 
optimized so that no new information emerges from participants. The researcher 
interviewed all the participants at their homes, offices, and construction sites. 
Participants were asked to provide their perception of “the political factors 
that led to Ghanaian government project abandonment.” Interviews took place 
between June 2014-January 2015 and December 2016-February 2017. They 
were audio-recorded and were conducted in English (though participants could 
speak in their local language if  they wished, none did). Each interview lasted 
between 30 and 50 minutes.
The data were analyzed using content and thematic techniques following the 
coding system suggested by Corbin and Strauss (2008). The texts of the semi-
structured interviews were analyzed with the use of words and were achieved 
with the help of NVivo10 software and Microsoft Word. This was based on 
two levels of codes: higher and lower. Higher-level codes were used to represent 
the main themes that explained the interpretation of the data (interpretivist 
tradition). The lower-level codes were used to further explain the higher-level 
ones. The lower and upper-level codes shared common content and dimensions 
that would collectively fall under one theme. The various codes were further 
coded according to their similarity or similar meanings. The last stage was 
further coded into the main themes. In all, we arrived at three major themes 
after coding and subcoding. The themes were analyzed in order of how often 
they were mentioned and the number of respondents who mentioned them. The 
three main themes under the political factors for Ghanaian government program 
and project abandonment are presented below; however, they are interrelated.
Findings and Discussions
The study’s participants perceived several political factors that account for 
Ghanaian government program and project abandonment. Our data indicates 
that partisanship politics, political clientelism, and political culture account 
strongly for Ghanaian government program and project implementation failure 
and abandonment.
Partisanship Politics
First and foremost, partisanship politics is manifested in a political agenda 
when there is a change in government. All the interviewees agreed that, when 
there is a change in government, most former government programs and 
projects are abandoned due to the political agenda of the new government 
to meet their campaign promises. Respondents perceived that this happens 
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because such programs and projects will not be credited to the new party that 
assumes power. It was revealed that governments over the years have been more 
interested in winning the next general election rather than serving the interests 
of the nation, and, as such, each government intends to support its “own” 
programs and projects. Respondents perceived that “citizens in the country 
judge the government’s performance based on its ability to successfully complete 
programs and projects” (R27).
A further question of why revealed the shared perception that most 
Ghanaians are illiterate and that they do not understand issues such as GDP, 
microand macro economics, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, the balance 
of payments, and other fiscal and monetary policies. What they care about instead 
are the programs and projects (especially the physical infrastructure) that they 
see. Respondents opined that this accounted for why a lot of commissioning and 
“cutting of sod” for government programs and projects take place in election 
years. One very experienced project practitioner stated that: “that is the reason 
why, when elections are close, a lot of projects are started, sods are cut, and 
projects commissioned in Ghana” (R2). Therefore, continuing the previous 
government’s projects will mean that the current or incumbent government is 
not doing “anything.” Accordingly,
Successive governments over the years have been compelled to embark 
on their “own” programs and projects after coming into power instead of 
continuing the previous government-initiated ones. The people [citizens] 
are so illiterate that if  you do not put up projects, especially infrastructure 
projects, [they] do not recognize whatever you do. All [that] they know is 
project, project, project. (R2)
Partisanship bias is further manifested in poor planning and implementation 
programs and projects. Our data indicate that Ghanaian government projects 
are not well planned, and this eventually leads to abandonment after initiation 
or halfway through the project life cycle. Respondents opined that poor 
planning happens at all stages of the project life cycle. Respondents cited many 
reasons that account for the poor planning and implementation of Ghanaian 
government programs or projects; reasons they saw as interrelated. They link 
this to the political leadership of programs and projects. First, they said that, in 
some programs or projects, leaders are appointed based on political patronage 
rather than technical know-how and, therefore, they lack the technical know-
how to implement them—which leads to abandonment as they are unable to 
complete them. Second, respondents perceived that the government often starts 
many more programs and projects than it can finance. All respondents agreed 
that this is a fundamental reason for the abandonment of Ghanaian government 
programs and projects. In the words of R14: “Sometimes, instead of finishing 
one program or project before starting another, the government starts several 
of them at the same time, for fear that other districts may complain about the 
government not carrying out programs or projects in their community.”
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This finding is supported by an earlier study conducted by Tennant and Clayton 
(2010) on infrastructural project implementation in Jamaica, which concluded that 
the project faced serious and long-term challenges due to the political decisions of 
the government. Despite the supporting evidence that suggested that the project 
was not viable, the government went ahead with it. Closely related to the poor 
planning of program and project funding is an allocation of the funds to various 
government programs and projects—in other words, budgeting. The reason here 
is that they fail to carry out proper budgeting for these programs and projects 
before starting them. One interviewee opined that:
I think generally it [is] because of poor planning… that relates to the 
funding. Elsewhere you realize that, when projects are conceived, budgetary 
allocation is fixed: if  you do not have that budget allocation, no one even 
asks you to tender; but here, the perception is that the money is there—you 
go ahead and we will pay—and, somewhere in between, the government 
with the financial institutions will get short of funding. And then everybody 
will be looking at the [small amount of] funds that come through. (R16)
Furthermore, it was revealed that the government (or political parties) 
makes unrealistic campaign promises concerning programs and projects without 
knowing how they are going to obtain the requisite funds. They start such 
programs and projects as soon as they assume power without making adequate 
financial planning. “In doing so, they rely on donor promises, so if  donors fail 
them, the projects have to come to a halt or [are] abandoned altogether. The 
government starts more projects than it can finance. There is a poor budgetary 
allocation for projects in the country” (R6).
Finally, respondents perceived that poor feasibility studies lead to poor 
planning. This is because, once there is a poor feasibility study, what the whole 
program/project is about might not be known before its initial planning of how the 
project(s) will be carried out; hence, an incorrect plan might be drawn up. This is 
also linked to campaign promises, as discussed above. Thus, because politicians have 
made campaign promises to embark on programs and projects, they are compelled 
to execute such promises without properly conducting feasibility studies.
Poor planning has been identified as a source of program/project failure 
by researchers such as Odeyinka and yusif  (1997), Odeh and Battaineh (2002), 
Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006), Pourrostam and Ismail (2011), and Pinto (2013). 
However, these were discussed in relation to the practitioners (technocrats) or 
the practicing organization while this study is focused on political leadership 
failure to plan properly due to political factors. In addition, one reason cited by 
respondents is the inability of Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) 
to justify why donor agencies should disburse program and project funds. 
According to R12,
Donor agencies do not normally give out the entire money for the 
implementation of government programs and projects but disburse it in bits. 
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The disbursements are tied to project performance and progress. However, 
in most cases, MDAs are unable to justify why donors should disburse such 
funds to projects because, often times, such projects are behind schedule or 
are not being used for what they were purported for.
The data indicate that the government (MDAs) diverts programs and project 
funds to other activities and, as a result, is unable to account for such funds in the 
name of the program or project in question. When this happens, the government 
has to look for money from somewhere else to continue the program or project 
to the level at which the donors would be willing to disburse money and, if  the 
government is unable to come up with such funds, then the program or project 
has to be abandoned.
Political Clientelism
Programs and projects are often halted due to political clientelism (yıldırım 
and Kitschelt 2020) because politicians want to terminate the existing contracts 
and re-award them to party members as soon as they come into power. This is 
often a difficult process that involves many legal procedures, and sometimes 
the contractor whose contract is being terminated feels cheated because s/he 
does not “belong” to the party in power. The aggrieved person often sues the 
government, and the court outcomes have resulted in what is popularly known 
as “gargantuan” government debt payments (Bawumia 2014, 2015). One 
contractor (R8) stated that:
One project had been in place for over seven years and it had come to 
a halt because the government officials wanted to re-award it, based on 
noncompletion, but before they could do that, the current contractor had 
to sign documents proving noncompletion. However, because it was not 
his fault, he decided not to sign, which led to the project being abandoned.
This finding is echoed by Richard Jeffries’ (1982) study of Rawlings and 
the political economy of underdevelopment in Ghana. This research found that 
different regimes over the years dating back to the colonial and post-colonial 
eras have pursued different government programs and projects through different 
ideologies, but some of them were abandoned after regime change (Jeffries 1982). 
Typical examples are those industrialization policies pursued by Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, and the “Operation Feed yourself” 
program pursued by Ignatius Kutu Acheampong in the 1970s (Aryeetey and 
Harrigan 2000; Girdner et al. 1980).
Another dimension of social benefits clientelism involves politically inspired 
programs and projects rather than people- or community-inspired ones. 
Respondents believe that the main reason for the lack of project patronage at 
both project management and product levels is when programs and projects are 
inspired by the government (politicians) instead of the community where they 
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are being implemented. Respondents said that government officials often fail 
to carry out proper feasibility studies concerning where programs and projects 
are needed. They fail to do so because of campaign promises. As a result, 
the government implements programs and projects in certain places simply 
because politicians have promised to provide a specific number of programs 
or projects and they should implement such programs/projects. Politicians, 
therefore, “dump” programs and projects on local communities. If  this happens, 
government officials would have no option but to abandon the project or 
program.
Some respondents (R1, R2, R7, R10, R13, R16 R20, R27, and R30) said 
that, when a project is a community-inspired one, then stakeholder participation 
is normally strong. Moreover, if  a project is a government-inspired one or 
one that is initiated from national, regional, district, or municipal level, then 
stakeholder participation is weak—often leading to abandonment. As a result, 
“the beneficiaries sometimes pose a threat to the project’s success, both at the 
management level and at the product level” (R27)—resulting in a failure to use 
the project’s deliverables. The result is again the abandonment of such programs 
or projects. Unlike in a collectivist society (see Ferragina 2009), these findings 
echo amoral familism, where the society can be likened to a nuclear family. As 
such the society is run like a family with collective efforts toward a common 
(Banfield 1958). The implication is that, despite the government projects being 
a public project, they may be perceived by a section of the community as 
belonging to a small “nuclear” family of political parties executing the projects. 
As such, they may lack the public support needed in the execution of public 
sector project.
Furthermore, preferential access to public (or quasi-public) employment 
clientelism leads to a lack of capacity to adequately implement government 
projects and programs. This likewise leads to abandonment. The lack of capacity 
was explained by respondents to mean two things: skill or knowledge and material 
resources. However, the emphasis was placed more on the former as the focus 
of the interview was on political reasons for program and project abandonment. 
Respondents argued that most government program and project leaders lack the 
knowledge to carry out such duties (R1, R2, R3, R4, R7, R9, R10, and R13). This 
happens mainly due to preferential access to public or quasi-public employment 
clientelism (R2, R10, R15, R18, R19, and R26), or by virtue of unqualified 
people occupying certain management and/or leadership positions due to their 
affiliation with the party in power (R6). Program and project leaders who are 
government-appointed officials are appointed on a political basis rather than 
on their own merits, and that is not about competence but the political party to 
which a person belongs. It was further revealed that, due to lack of knowledge, 
leaders of these programs engage themselves in activities that result in litigation; 
hence, projects or programs being abandoned. This finding echoed the work of 
Hwang and Ng (2013), which argues that a competent project manager is vital 
to project success, and that having a good project leader is vital to a project’s 
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performance. Similarly, Gomes, yasin, and Small (2012) established that a 
project manager’s skills have a significant influence on the success of a project’s 
implementation. However, these leadership problems are related to political 
and/or government official leadership lacking the requisite technical know-how 
rather than linked to qualified staff  who execute the projects as contractors or 
PMPs, as espoused by Hwang and Ng (2013) and Gomes, yasin, and Small in 
their studies. In the case of Ghanaian society—which is more of feminine society 
(The Hofstede Centre 2016)—political parties are perceived as a (nuclear) family 
(Banfield 1958; Damoah and Akwei 2017) and, as such, political party members 
are treated like family members in the awarding of government projects. In this 
way, project leadership and management positions are appointed on the basis 
of a “family” political patronage that may lead to abandonment, due to lack of 
required project management skills.
Additionally, political clientelism is manifested through political corruption, 
mostly through public works/procurement clientelism. All the respondents 
identified corruption as one of the factors for government program and project 
abandonment. According to them, corruption has become part of Ghanaian 
government program and project implementation, and the act has become a 
“norm” (R9), and even an “open secret” (R1, R5, R9, R15, R16, R18, R19, 
R22, R24, and R26). Participants cited numerous reasons for corruption in 
government project abandonment and perceived that all these corrupt practices 
happened due to how politicians and project leaders “play” politics with 
implementation through the public works/procurement clientelism.
My brother, everything in Ghana is about politics. Politicians play politics 
with every government project—even those projects that are engineered 
by donor agencies are run by politicians. you know what, some of these 
politicians do not know anything about projects and programs but, because 
their party is in power, they would control the project and play politics with 
it… they would not allow the technocrats to implement the project. (R30)
Even the so-called technocrats are political appointees and therefore they 
go there (occupying such position) with the aim of helping their respective 
parties who appointed them. (R17)
One major underlining reason cited by respondents concerned the 
bureaucratic procedures involved in the government program and project 
implementation process that lead to corrupt practices. Due to the numerous 
channels that contractors have to go through to obtain their payment, they have 
to do several “follow-ups.” And, to “speed up the payment” process, they make 
“under the table” payments to government officials (R1, R7, R4, R20, and R28). 
The slow pace and delays in the payment process, therefore, compel contractors 
to offer bribes in return for quick payment. These bureaucratic procedures, 
according to the respondents, have been created by politicians so that they can 
benefit from corrupt activities. The interviewees attributed this to politicians in 
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that they deliberately create such a slow pace coupled with a lot of paperwork, so 
that “you would be compelled to give [a] ‘brown envelope’ to them; I believe you 
know what [a] brown envelope is… bribe, you know” (R25). In the words of R22,
Politicians and civil servants who are mainly party members deliberately 
make the procurement and other paperwork so long and bureaucratic, so 
that you would have no choice than to do follow up. The follow-up means 
that you have to have “connections” with an insider who would lead you, 
otherwise forget it. I have a lot of personal experience; it is the naked truth, 
but no one would admit it. you are afraid to admit [it] because you do not 
know whom you are talking to… if the media gets to know of it, they would 
bring your company and the government down, so you have to deny it.
These institutional bottlenecks are major factors that stifle public 
administration. The data also revealed that, not only are the contractors 
compelled to pay, but the political leaders of the programs and projects 
specifically demand bribes before awarding contracts.
In addition, 20 (R1, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, R10, R11, R14, R15, R16, R17, 
R18, R19, R20, R21, R22, R23, R24, and R25) out of the 30 respondents stated 
that it has become a norm for contractors to informally pay 10 percent of the 
contract sum to government officials to win a contract, and it is practically 
impossible for contractors to be awarded a contract if  they fail to make 
such payments. Further to this, when contracts are being awarded, there are 
“unofficial middlemen” (R9) between government officials and contractors, and 
these men take money from both sides, to “link them up” for a contract deal. 
According to respondent R9,
Sometimes contracts are awarded before the official bidding for the 
contract. If  this corrupt act happens, government officials are unable 
to ensure that the projects have been completed. My brother, everybody 
knows this, but the politicians and contractors would deny [it] in public—I 
believe you should know this already. you can even ask a class 1 pupil and 
they would tell you the same thing. We have [a] serious problem in this 
country and I do not know how we can stop this; if  you do not pay, others 
would go and pay.
Indeed, corruption has become a hot topic in Ghana in recent years (Addo ; 
Bawumia 2014, 2015; Imani Ghana 2014; Mark 2015), even though the 
phenomenon has been endemic in the public administration of  the country 
for a long time (Jeffries 1982). The results of  this research confirms public 
opinion concerning this. The finding is also congruent with Transparency 
International and other media reports concerning corruption in the country 
(Sanders 2015). Afrobaromter reports over the years also indicate that the 
fight against corruption in the country is on the decline (Afrobarometer 2019). 
More than half  (53 percent) of  Ghanaians in 2018 perceived that the level of 
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corruption in the country had risen in the past year, a 17-percentage-point 
increase compared to the 2017 survey (Afrobarometer 2019). However, the 
previous literature on corruption in Ghana has predominantly been reports, 
lectures, and media reports (Addo ; Bawumia 2015; Ghanaian Chronicle 2012; 
Imani Ghana 2014; Sanders 2015). This finding adds an academic dimension 
to the literature.
Corruption intensifies due to the public works clientelism in government 
programs and projects because contracts are often given to family and political 
party members to reward them for their loyalty to the political party in 
government and to use profits made from such programs and projects to fund 
the party.
Do you think, you can get [a] government project contract if  you are not 
related to any politician or people in [a] high position? Didn’t you hear that 
the majority leader in parliament described the Mahama-led government 
as family and friends; oh sorry, you don’t live in the country. This came 
from the government’s own party parliamentarian because he felt all the 
key ministerial appointments are being given to only family members and 
people close to the president and his wife. (R24)
This finding confirms the study conducted by Luna (2015), which concluded 
that party members collude with government officials and contractors to syphon 
government funds through construction contracts and then, they pay back 
in the form of kickbacks. The participants stated that, because contracts are 
awarded on a family and political affiliation basis, contractors can abandon such 
programs and projects without fear of arrest and/or prosecution. In agreement 
with partisanship and political theories (Lebamoff 2019), this finding suggests 
that being affiliated with the government’s political party serves as a leeway for 
unaccountable political stewardship (Putnam 1971).
It was revealed that, sometimes, political party members are encouraged 
through their party leadership to set up companies specifically to execute 
such programs and projects, and, therefore, the companies may not have the 
competence and track record to merit the award of such contracts. Therefore, 
they are unable to successfully complete such programs and projects; hence, 
abandonment. For instance, R20 opined that:
Did you hear of Better Ghana Company? It was all over the news that this 
company was set up purposely to undertake government projects when the 
NDC came to power in 2009. you know that Better Ghana Agenda was 
the slogan of the NDC; it even came up in the Auditor General Report 
and [was shown] on television, so I can confidently mention names. This 
company took the projects, but they did not execute any project and, as I 
am speaking to you now, no one has been punished.
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Political Culture/National Culture
Projects and programs are abandoned due to Ghana’s political and national 
cultures. Two of the participants interviewed (R9 and R10) opined that, 
sometimes, government officials appoint their own family members to lead 
programs and projects when they are not qualified to do so. Here, Hofstede’s 
(1983) cultural dimension concerning Ghana is in evidence: the Ghanaian culture 
is characterized by family unity and bonds, and as such anybody occupying a 
higher position, such as those in the political hierarchy in society, are expected 
to help their family members if  they are to be recognized in society. The 
implication of this, according to our respondents, is that they can do whatever 
they want and get off  scot-free; hence, they are able to abandon programs and 
projects. This finding can be traced to the national culture of Ghanaians as 
espoused by the Hofstede Centre (2016)—there is a very strong family bond, 
which serves as the primary source of identity, loyalty, and responsibility. This 
explains why program and project contracts are awarded based on family and 
political patronage instead of on merit. Similarly, this finding agrees with an 
earlier study conducted by Bob-Milliar (2012), which found that citizens in the 
country join and participate in political activities in exchange for tangible and 
intangible benefits and/or material incentives. This finding indicates that those 
benefiting from such government contracts may be mostly the political elite of 
the incumbent political party (Putnam 1971). Figure 1 systematizes the relation 
between the political factors behind project abandonment in Ghana discussed 
above as they emerged from the respondents’ interviews.
Figure 1.  
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Conclusions
This article sought to examine how political factors can create or contribute 
to conditions that lead to government project abandonment, focusing on 
the Ghanaian government’s programs and projects. The study shows that 
politics, particularly partisan politics, play a key role in Ghanaian government 
project abandonment. We identified three major political factors that lead to 
abandonment: partisanship politics, political clientelism, and political culture. 
These are manifested in the political agenda, in political corruption (corruption 
in government), and through poor planning and implementation (due to politics).
These political factors were linked to partisan politics and political 
clientelism, where program and project contracts are awarded based on political 
patronage rather than on merit. Likewise, program and project leaders are 
appointed based on party patronage; hence, the aim of such leaders is to satisfy 
the party hierarchy that appointed them. This leads to the appointment of 
leaders who lack the capacity or skill to carry out these programs and projects 
and, ultimately, to project abandonment. Change in government and political 
agenda were found to be major reasons for program and project abandonment. 
The general perception offered by our interviewees was that continuing previous 
government programs and projects implies that, during a general election, voters 
may not vote for the incumbent because they have no projects or programs 
to show; hence, politicians are compelled to start their own project/programs 
with which they can be associated and for which they expect the credit. The 
underlining reason is that many Ghanaians are illiterate and, therefore, do not 
understand economic issues such as fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore, the 
only benchmark they use to assess government performance is program and 
project performance.
The political culture could be traced to the cultural orientation of the 
Ghanaians, as espoused by Hofstede (1983), where people in authority are 
supposed to support their family and friends in exchange for recognition within 
the family. Being part of a political party in Ghana is like being part of a family. 
Therefore, leaders reward their party faithfully with the award of contracts. 
However, in most cases these family, friends, and the party faithful might not 
possess the requisite technical know-how needed to carry out such projects; 
hence, abandonment.
We identified corruption in government as a major form of political 
clientelism that has led to the abandonment of Ghanaian government programs 
and projects. This is linked to government officials making demands from 
contractors before awarding such contracts as well as awarding contracts on 
party patronage; hence, they are unable to enforce the successful completion 
of programs and projects. Contractors who are mainly party members can, 
therefore, abandon programs and projects without being punished.
Poor planning and implementation of the programs is thus based on 
partisanship politics and mainly relate to poor budgeting and starting more 
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projects than the country can finance, thereby relying on foreign donors. 
The implication is that, if  donors fail to provide funding support, then such 
programs and projects would have to be abandoned. Furthermore, politicians 
make unrealistic campaign promises concerning programs and projects. They 
are thus compelled to embark on these programs and projects without carrying 
out proper feasibility studies, thereby dumping them on local people; hence, 
there is a lack of patronage, which leads to abandonment.
Contributions to Theory
The literature indicates that government programs and projects are 
indispensable in the development of every nation (Alic 2008; Eichengreen and 
Varquez 1999). yet some of these programs and projects have failed through 
abandonment (Fabian and Attaran 2011; Kumar and Best 2006), and in 
developing countries abandonment has become a rule rather than an exception 
(Central Press Newspaper 2013; Clausen and Attaran 2011; Kumar and Best 
2006; Zoure 2011). Abandoned government programs and projects have been 
discussed in relation to the general factors that lead to abandonment (Clausen 
and Attaran 2011; Kumar and Best 2006). We nevertheless offer a novel finding 
and a framework on how political clientelism and partisanship politics impact 
on the abandonment of public sector projects in the context of a developing 
country. We hope this can be used to deepen our understanding of the role of 
politics in public sector projects management, to extend the public policy and 
management literature, and to encourage further research, theorization, and 
teaching.
Contributions to Practice
This study also has several practical implications. First, the findings 
indicate that all the factors are either directly or indirectly linked to politics, 
particularly party politics, and, therefore, are interrelated. The implication 
here is that the management of Ghanaian government programs and projects 
need to harness the skills necessary to manage those politicians leading such 
programs or projects if  they are to be successful in implementing programs and 
projects in Ghana—and this is the case for developing countries in general. The 
suggestion is that programs and projects should be managed by experts with the 
necessary qualification rather than being managed through political patronage. 
An independent body devoid of party politics is required to oversee project 
management. The part which should be certified by government officials should 
constitute both the incumbent and the opposition members of parliaments—
thus, bi-partisanship participation.
Additionally, Ghanaian government programs and projects should not be 
based on a party manifesto; they should be based on national policy directives. 
In this case, all political parties, civil societies, and policy think tanks should 
meet to devise a national agenda on program and project implementation. This 
should subsequently be subject to parliamentary approval. The basic model 
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should become national development policy—so that individual political party 
manifestos rest on how they can achieve the national agenda rather than coming 
up with their own manifesto on programs and projects. This, we suggest, would 
ensure continuity of programs and projects after a change of government.
To ensure proper planning to avoid program and project abandonment, 
governments need to ensure that funds are available and released from donor 
agencies before a program or project commences. It can also be suggested that, 
apart from national programs or projects, the government should allow local 
communities to initiate their own local programs or projects rather than these 
being “dumped” on them. Government representatives at the local level should 
play an advisory role rather than taking the lead. This will allow local ownership 
of programs and projects; hence, local participation and patronage of project 
deliverables.
Of course, the main limitation of this research has been the use of a purposive 
sampling technique in the selection of the participants. This means that findings 
may not be generalizable. However, this is an exploratory study that sought to 
espouse the phenomenon of corruption in the implementation of government 
program and project abandonment.
APPENDIX A.
Ghanaian Cultural Dimension
Table A1. Hofstede 6-D Model
Cultural Dimensions Scores (%) Ghanaian Cultural Attributes
Power Distance 80 Acceptance of hierarchical order in society and 
organizations
Individualism 15 Collectivist society
Masculinity 40 Relatively feminine society
Uncertainty Avoidance 65 Prefer to avoid uncertainty
Long-Term Orientation 4 Great respect for traditions, a relatively small 
propensity to save for the future, and a focus 
on achieving quick results
Indulgence 72 Willingness to realize their impulses
The desire to enjoy life and having fun
Places a higher degree of importance on leisure 
time, act as they please and spend money as 
they wish
Source: The Hofstede Centre (2016).
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